IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/chinae/v15y2007i4p102-117.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Deferred Executive Compensation Policies in Chinese State‐owned Enterprises

Author

Listed:
  • Min Ju

Abstract

Since the commencement of industrial reform in China, most Chinese state‐owned enterprises have adopted a deferred executive compensation policy to provide incentives for their management teams. However, the effectiveness of such a policy needs to be evaluated. In this paper, we specify a model of deferred executive compensation policy, in which the compensation for executives is contingent on firms' future revenue. The model suggests that under deferred executive compensation policies, managers exhibit an increasing level of effort in every period. Furthermore, the deferred compensation policy encourages managers to make long‐term investments, which might generate revenue even after the termination of managerial contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Min Ju, 2007. "Deferred Executive Compensation Policies in Chinese State‐owned Enterprises," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 15(4), pages 102-117, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:chinae:v:15:y:2007:i:4:p:102-117
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-124X.2007.00078.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-124X.2007.00078.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1749-124X.2007.00078.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Takao Kato & Cheryl Long, 2004. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and State Ownership in China: Evidence from New Panel Data," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-690, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jiang, Wei & Liu, Yunguo & Lobo, Gerald J. & Xu, Yue, 2019. "Deferred cash compensation and risk-taking: Evidence from the Chinese banking industry," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 432-448.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kato, Takao & Kim, Woochan & Lee, Ju Ho, 2007. "Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 36-55, January.
    2. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from New Micro Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1914, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Intan Oviantari Author_Email: ioviantari@yahoo.com, 2011. "Directors And Commissioners Remuneration And Firm Performance: Indonesian Evidence," 2nd International Conference on Business and Economic Research (2nd ICBER 2011) Proceeding 2011-287, Conference Master Resources.
    4. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 945-983, July.
    5. Wenjuan Xie, 2013. "Do Investors See Through Accounting Profitability and Recognize Efficiency? Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 17(3-4), pages 243-293, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:chinae:v:15:y:2007:i:4:p:102-117. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iwepacn.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.