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The Neoclassical Model Enriched by the Structure of Control:

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  • Jerry Evensky

Abstract

Traditional neoclassical theory treats the economic sphere as if it can be detached from its surrounding social and political environment. It assumes connections between the social/political spheres and the economic sphere are weak, and no change of significance occurs in the social and political environment during the period considered Social and political conditions are treated as “given” and, more often than not, the conditions of this given environment are neither specified nor studied A broader economics is needed The Virginia School has represented a connection between political control and distributive outcomes with its rent‐seeking analysis The flaw in their argument, that exposes their ideological bent, is their failure to extend the analysis to the distributive impact of control in the social sphere. This piece is an attempt to make that extension, and to demonstrate that a specific historical case, women s experience in World War II, cannot be fully understood without bringing that social dimension into the analysis

Suggested Citation

  • Jerry Evensky, 1991. "The Neoclassical Model Enriched by the Structure of Control:," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 207-222, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:50:y:1991:i:2:p:207-222
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1991.tb03329.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stigler, George J, 1970. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, April.
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