What the economic analysis of law can't do - pitfalls and practical implications

In the last decades, the influence of the economic approach to law has expanded constantly, sometimes alarmingly so, efficiency and utility considerations steeping deep into the fabric of all aspects pertaining to the creation and application of law. Following a brief overview of the economic analysis of law, with references to utilitarianism, the Chicago School and their modern spin-offs, this article will attempt to convey the limitations that such an approach inevitably presents and some of its the practical consequences in the legal field. The main tenant is that the economic analysis of law is neither applicable to all subject matters, nor is it ideologically-neutral. The methodological instruments used for this research include, inter alia, the comparative method and case studies of both legislation and jurisprudence. The Covid-19 crisis of 2020 will inevitably augment the importance of the economic factors in shaping future public policies and legislation. The tendency to prioritise the economic considerations will prove difficult to resist for governments confronted with receding economies, rising public debt and social pressures of various origins. Therefore, we consider that a realistic debate on the pitfalls of the economic approach to law is necessary and serves not merely theoretical purposes, but practical ones as well.