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Analyse économique de la définition du marché pertinent : son apport au droit de la concurrence

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  • Glais, Michel

Abstract

The markets on which an economic power is [or could be] exerced represents the first delicate but very often essential step in the analysis of the legality of the firms strategic behaviour with regard to competition law. Even if the American conception of the "antitrust" market is widely prevailing in Europe, a few differences still remain though, for instance, in the more concrete dividing up of relevant markets. In this article the detailed presentation of the methods used by the French & community authorities aims at enabling the firms to be better-prepared for the dialogue they may have to hold with these ones, particularly within the framework of their external growth projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Glais, Michel, 2003. "Analyse économique de la définition du marché pertinent : son apport au droit de la concurrence," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 277.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ersfer:355212
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.355212
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baker, Jonathan B & Baresnahan, Timothy F, 1985. "The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product-differentiated Industries," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 427-444, June.
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