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Information and Communication in Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Inga Deimen
  • Dezsö Szalay

Abstract

We study a constrained information design problem in an organization. A designer chooses the information structure. A sender with preferences different from the decision-maker observes and processes the information before he communicates with the decision-maker. Information shapes conflicts within the organization: the optimal information structure essentially eliminates conflicts and serves as a substitute to the allocation of decision-making authority in the organization.

Suggested Citation

  • Inga Deimen & Dezsö Szalay, 2019. "Information and Communication in Organizations," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 109, pages 545-549, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:109:y:2019:p:545-49
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20191099
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vaccari, Federico, 2022. "Efficient Communication in Organizations," FEEM Working Papers 329583, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    2. Qianqian Zhou & Yuhui Bao & Yiwei Zhao & Xinyao He & Caiyun Cui & Yong Liu, 2022. "Impacts of Government Credit on Government Performance of Public-Private Partnership Project in China: A WSR System Theory Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(11), pages 1-18, June.
    3. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
    4. Antić, Nemanja & Persico, Nicola, 2023. "Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 299-310.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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