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Cross-State Strategic Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Gordon B. Dahl
  • Joseph Engelberg
  • Runjing Lu
  • William Mullins

Abstract

We estimate that 3.1 percent of US voters, or 6.1 million individuals, were registered to vote in two states in 2020, opening up the possibility for them to choose where to vote. Double registrants are concentrated in the wealthiest zip codes and respond to both incentives and costs, disproportionately choosing to vote in swing states (higher incentive) and states that automatically send out mail-in ballots (lower cost). We call this behavior Cross-State Strategic Voting. While others have documented strategic incentives on who to vote for, this paper is the first to consider strategic incentives on where to vote.

Suggested Citation

  • Gordon B. Dahl & Joseph Engelberg & Runjing Lu & William Mullins, 2026. "Cross-State Strategic Voting," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 159-189, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:18:y:2026:i:1:p:159-89
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20240630
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K16 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Election Law

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