An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats
Download full text from publisher
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Lien, Yuanchuan, 2014.
"An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 506-533.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Yuanchuan Lien, 2009. "An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction," IEW - Working Papers 428, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Chernomaz, Kirill & Levin, Dan, 2012. "Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 611-635.
- Heinrich, Timo & Brosig-Koch, Jeannette, 2015. "Promises and Social Distance in Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112892, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Gediminas Adomavicius & Shawn P. Curley & Alok Gupta & Pallab Sanyal, 2012. "Effect of Information Feedback on Bidder Behavior in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(4), pages 811-830, April.
- Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Jürgen Wolf, 2013. "Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 511-545, December.
- Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx & Tom Wilkening, 2015. "A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(4), pages 857-897, December.
- Heczko, Alexander & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion, 2018. "The Performance of Core-Selecting Auctions: An Experiment," EconStor Preprints 176842, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
- Tobias Scheffel & Georg Ziegler & Martin Bichler, 2012. "On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(4), pages 667-692, December.
- Kopányi-Peuker, Anita & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2017.
"Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 273-290.
- Anita Kopanyi-Peuker & Theo Offerman & Randolph Sloof, 2012. "Fostering Cooperation through the Enhancement of Own Vulnerability," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-132/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.
- repec:spr:infosf:v:17:y:2015:i:5:d:10.1007_s10796-014-9491-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kagel, John H. & Lien, Yuanchuan & Milgrom, Paul, 2014. "Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 210-231.
- Filiz-Ozbay, Emel & Lopez-Vargas, Kristian & Ozbay, Erkut Y., 2015. "Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1-16.
- Bichler, Martin & Goeree, Jacob K., 2017. "Frontiers in spectrum auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 372-391.
- Sano, Ryuji, 2012. "Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 637-650.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
- Katerina Sherstyuk & Nina Karmanskaya & Pavel Teslia, 2016. "Bidding with money or action plans? Asset allocation under strategic uncertainty," Working Papers 201603, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Kan Takeuchi & John Lin & Yan Chen & Thomas Finholt, 2010. "Scheduling with package auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(4), pages 476-499, December.
More about this item
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
ListsThis item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
- An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats (AEJ:MI 2010) in ReplicationWiki
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:2:y:2010:i:1:p:39-57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael P. Albert). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.