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Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers

Author

Listed:
  • Aaron Chalfin
  • Felipe Gonçalves

Abstract

We study how public sector workers balance their professional motivations with private economic concerns, focusing on police arrests. Arrests made near the end of an officer's shift typically require overtime work, and officers respond by reducing arrest frequency but increasing arrest quality. Days in which an officer works a second job after their police shift have higher opportunity cost, also reducing late-shift arrests. Combining our estimates in a dynamic model identifies officer preferences over workplace activity and overtime work. Our results indicate that officers' private costs of arrests have a first-order impact on the quantity and quality of enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Aaron Chalfin & Felipe Gonçalves, 2026. "Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 116(8), pages 2962-2995, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:116:y:2026:i:8:p:2962-95
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20231696
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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