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The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture

Author

Listed:
  • Charles R. Plott
  • Hsing-Yang Lee
  • Travis Maron

Abstract

The paper reports the architecture of a continuous combinatorial auction. Preferences are based on sets of items and feasibility requires the nonintersection of sets. Countdown clocks replace eligibility and activity requirements typical of rounds-based auctions. Bids remain in the system to be combined with new bids to form winning collections. Increment requirements dictate improvements over appropriate collections of existing bids. The auction evolved from experimental methods and operates at high levels of efficiency. Field applications are reported and result in natural equilibration in a few hours as opposed to days or weeks required by round-based architectures.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles R. Plott & Hsing-Yang Lee & Travis Maron, 2014. "The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 452-456, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:452-56
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.452
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pallab Sanyal, 2016. "Characteristics and Economic Consequences of Jump Bids in Combinatorial Auctions," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 27(2), pages 347-364, June.
    2. Charles R. Plott & Timothy N. Cason & Benjamin J. Gillen & Hsingyang Lee & Travis Maron, 2023. "General equilibrium methodology applied to the design, implementation and performance evaluation of large, multi-market and multi-unit policy constrained auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 641-693, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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