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Measurement of Voting Power: a Preliminary Analysis of an Historical French Electoral Episode Through Simulations


  • Dominique Lepelley
  • Laurent Vidu


In this article we employ the theory of power indices to evaluate the respective influence of the two classes of electors in the polling method introduced by the electoral law of 29 June 1820, a method known as the law of "double vote". We will show, using amplified model, that the voting power of "major" voters, who vote twice, is at least three or four times that of "minor" voters who only vote once. The model that is proposed is an extension of one recently used by EDELMAN [2004] to study situations in which some voters belong to more than one electoral college. The impact of the simplifying hypotheses underlying this model is assessed using simulations.

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  • Dominique Lepelley & Laurent Vidu, 2011. "Measurement of Voting Power: a Preliminary Analysis of an Historical French Electoral Episode Through Simulations," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 101-102, pages 71-85.
  • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:71-85

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    1. Candeal, J. C. & Indurain, E., 1995. "Homothetic and weakly homothetic preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 147-158.
    2. Sen, Amartya, 1991. "Welfare, preference and freedom," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1-2), pages 15-29, October.
    3. Yongsheng Xu, 2004. "On ranking linear budget sets in terms of freedom of choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(1), pages 281-289, February.
    4. Sen, Amartya, 1988. "Freedom of choice : Concept and content," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 269-294, March.
    5. Deschamps, Robert & Gevers, Louis, 1978. "Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 143-163, April.
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