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No-Show Paradoxes under Parliamentary Agendas

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  • Boniface Mbih
  • Xingyu Zhao

Abstract

It may happen that the favorite candidate of a voter loses an election if that voter votes honestly, but gets elected if the voter abstains. Such a situation is known in the social choice literature under the name of « no-show paradox ». This paper is devoted to the evaluation of the likelihood of that phenomenon under parliamentary voting rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Boniface Mbih & Xingyu Zhao, 2011. "No-Show Paradoxes under Parliamentary Agendas," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 101-102, pages 127-147.
  • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:127-147
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41615477
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Merlin & Marc Fleurbaey & Dominique Lepelley, 2012. "Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 253-257, July.

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