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Oxford University Press Journal of Law, Economics and Organization Contact information of
Oxford University Press: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK Fax: 01865 267 985 Email: Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
Order information: Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals Editor:
For technical questions regarding this series, please contact
(Christopher F. Baum) Series handle: repec:oup:jleorg
More pages of listings: 0 |1 |2
1992, Volume 8, Issue 1
111-18 Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies: A Comment: Bureaucratic Drift, Coalition Drift, and Time Consistency by Shepsle, Kenneth A
119-25 Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies: Comment by Levine, Michael E
126-54 Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate by Spulber, Daniel F & Besanko, David
155-58 Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate: Comment by Ross, Stephen F
159-64 Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate: Comments by Arvan, Lanny
165-89 Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State by Eskridge, William N, Jr & Ferejohn, John
190-96 Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State: A Comment: Positive Models and Normative Theory by Knight, Jack
197-204 Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State: A Comment: The Administrative State and the Original Understanding by Rodriguez, Daniel B
205-13 Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State: A Response: The Game of Politics and Law by Strauss, Peter L & Rutten, Andrew R
1991, Volume 7, Issue 2 201-28 Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form by Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean
229-47 Controlling the Game: Political Sponsors and Bureaus by Bagnoli, Mark & McKee, Michael
248-83 Cooperation versus Competition in Agency by Ramakrishnan, Ram T S & Thakor, Anjan V
284-312 Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley vs. Baxendale by Bebchuk, Lucian Ayre & Shavell, Steven
313-33 Constitutional Rights by Mueller, Dennis C
334-54 Bargaining Costs, Bargaining Benefits, and Compulsory Nonbargaining Rules by Haddock, David D & McChesney, Fred S
355-72 Imports and Domestic Wages: Is the Relationship Consistent with Expense Preference Behavior? by Heywood, John S
373-400 Constraining Administrative Decisions: A Critical Examination of the Structure and Process Hypothesis by Hill, Jeffrey S & Brazier, James E
401-09 Promotion Lotteries by O'Flaherty, Brendan & Siow, Aloysius
410-28 State Takeover Legislation: The Case of Delaware by Jahera, John S, Jr & Pugh, William N
1991, Volume 7, Issue 1 1-25 The Costs of Organization by Masten, Scott E & Meehan, James W, Jr & Snyder, Edward A
27-53 Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation by Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Alan
55-87 The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation? by Romano, Roberta
89-116 Indentured Prostitution in Imperial Japan: Credible Commitments in the Commercial Sex Industry by Ramseyer, J Mark
117-43 Surviving Industrial Targeting: State Credibility and Public Policy Contingencies in Multinational Subcontracting by Murtha, Thomas P
145-62 Premerger Notification and the Incentive to Merge and Litigate by Johnson, Ronald N & Parkman, Allen M
163-81 Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners by Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L
183-99 Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing Commission? by Cohen, Mark A
1991, Volume 7, Issue 0 1-6 Scale Returns in Communication and Elite Control of Organizations by Arrow, Kenneth J
7-23 Constructed Organization: First Principles by Coleman, James S
24-52 Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design by Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul
53-83 The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies by Joskow, Paul L
84-105 Privatization and Incentives by Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean
106-29 Politics and the Theory of Organization by Moe, Terry M
130-58 Reward Systems and the Distribution of Wages by Petersen, Trond
159-87 Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance by Williamson, Oliver E
1990, Volume 6, Issue 2 263-300 A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases by Gely, Rafael & Spiller, Pablo T
301-24 Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy by Laffont, Jean-Jacques
325-44 Auctions and Contract Enforcement by Spulber, Daniel F
345-80 The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory by Snyder, Edward A & Hughes, James W
381-409 Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency by Aghion, Philippe & Hermalin, Benjamin
410-31 Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Progressivity of Income Taxes by Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L
433-52 Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence by Hylton, Keith N
453-69 Switching Costs and Bidding Parity in Government Procurement of Computer Systems by Cabral, Luis M B & Greenstein, Shane
1990, Volume 6, Issue 1 1-31 The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions by Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean
33-63 Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation by Bendor, Jonathan & Mookherjee, Dilip
65-92 Diseconomies of Scale in Employment Contracts by Rasmusen, Eric & Zenger, Todd
93-128 Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions by Kaplow, Louis
129-54 Investment "Myopia" and the Internal Organization of Capital Allocation Decisions by Thakor, Anjan V
155-70 The Comparative Advantage of Long-term Contracts and Firms by Wiggins, Steven N
171-87 Time, Space, and Shopping: The Regulation of Shopping Hours by Ferris, J Stephen
189-201 Optimal Prosecution of Defendants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain by Miceli, Thomas J
203-15 Rings and Promises by Brinig, Margaret F
217-33 The Framing Hypothesis: Is It Supported by Credit Card Issuer Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price? by Kitch, Edmund W
235-51 An Analysis of the Stock Price Effect of the 1986 Ohio Takeover Legislation by Margotta, Donald G & McWilliams, Thomas P & McWilliams, Victoria B
253-62 Shareholder Wealth Effects of the 1986 Ohio Antitakeover Law Revisited: Its Real Effects by Ryngaert, Michael & Netter, Jeffry
1990, Volume 6, Issue 0 1-20 Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy by Ferejohn, John & Shipan, Charles
21-27 Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy: Comment by Rose-Ackerman, Susan
29-43 Extensions of Ferejohn and Shipan's Model of Administrative Agency Behavior by Spitzer, Matthew L
45-72 The Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing Groups by Shepsle, Kenneth & Nalebuff, Barry
73-77 Seniority, Commitment, and Self-Governing Groups by Krehbiel, Keith
79-132 Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record by Inman, Robert P & Fitts, Michael A
133-53 Budget Policy-Making and the Appearance of Power: Note by McCubbins, Mathew D
155-66 Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record: Comment by Rogerson, William P
167-98 Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis by Levine, Michael E & Forrence, Jennifer L
199-202 Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis: Comments by Katzmann, Robert A
203-12 Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy by McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R
213-53 Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story by Moe, Terry M
255-61 The Problems with PPT: Comment by Fiorina, Morris P
263-66 Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story--Comment by Williamson, Oliver E
267-98 Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development by Mashaw, Jerry L
299-306 Political Economy, Administrative Law: A Comment by Sunstein, Cass R
307-32 Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures by McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R
1989, Volume 5, Issue 2 225-48 Stock Trading before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation? by Jarrell, Gregg A & Poulsen, Annette B
249-69 Can Government Be Trusted to Keep Its Part of a Social Contract?: New Jersey and the Railroads, 1825-1888 by Grandy, Christopher
271-92 A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers by Knoeber, Charles R
293-306 Time Dependent Information Costs, Price Controls, and Successive Government Intervention by Lott, John R, Jr & Fremling, Gertrud M
307-31 An Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking by Ekelund, Robert B, Jr & Hebert, Robert F & Tollison, Robert D
333-53 Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and the Endogenous Choice of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choice by Campos, Jose Edgardo L
355-74 Information in Political Markets: A Little Knowledge Can Be a Dangerous Thing by Reed, W Robert
375-93 The Delaware Courts, Poison Pills, and Shareholder Wealth by Choi, Dosoung & Kamma, Sreenivas & Weintrop, Joseph
395-412 Tender Offer Auctions, Resistance Strategies, and Social Welfare by Berkovitch, Elazar & Bradley, Michael & Khanna, Naveen
413-24 Defensive Tactics and Optimal Search by Schwartz, Alan
1989, Volume 5, Issue 1 1-24 The Anatomy of Tax Evasion by Klepper, Steven & Nagin, Daniel
25-52 Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior by Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F
53-82 Bureaucratic Rules, Supervisor Behavior, and the Effect on Salaries in the Federal Government by Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D
83-97 A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry by Ellickson, Robert C
99-108 Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law by Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven
109-26 Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry by Pisano, Gary P
127-53 The Transaction-Cost Rationale for Countertrade by Hennart, Jean-Francois
155-84 The Impossibility of a Neutral Hierarchy by Hammond, Thomas H & Thomas, Paul A
185-210 The Interaction between Product Liability and Workers' Compensation as Ex Post Remedies for Workplace Injuries by Viscusi, W Kip
211-22 Homogeneous Middleman Groups: What Determines the Homogeneity? by La Croix, Sumner J
1988, Volume 4, Issue 2 217-41 How Markets for Impure Public Goods Organize: The Case of Household Refuse Collection by Dubin, Jeffrey A & Navarro, Peter
243-65 The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil Liability Rules by Trebilcock, Michael J
267-304 Ownership of the Firm by Hansmann, Henry
305-36 The Multinational Corporation's Degree of Control over Foreign Subsidiaries: An Empirical Test of a Transaction Cost Explanation by Gatignon, Hubert & Anderson, Erin
337-55 Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis by John, George & Weitz, Barton A
357-72 The Rationale for Regulation: Shareholder Losses under Various Assumptions about Managerial Cognition by Marcus, Alfred & Bromiley, Philip
373-83 Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law by Ryngaert, Michael & Netter, Jeffrey M
385-408 Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies by Baker, Jonathan B
1988, Volume 4, Issue 1 3-17 The Nature of the Firm: Origin by Coase, R H
19-32 The Nature of the Firm: Meaning by Coase, R H
33-47 The Nature of the Firm: Influence by Coase, R H
49-64 Transactions Costs and Internal Labor Markets by Rosen, Sherwin
65-93 The Logic of Economic Organization by Williamson, Oliver E
95-117 Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence by Joskow, Paul L
119-39 Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm by Hart, Oliver D
141-61 The Theory of the Firm Revisited by Demsetz, Harold
163-80 On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation by Winter, Sidney G
181-98 A Legal Basis for the Firm by Masten, Scott E
199-213 Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited by Klein, Benjamin
1987, Volume 3, Issue 2 143-76 Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper? by Katz, Avery
177-84 Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz's Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper? by Bowles, Roger
185-92 Legal Fees: A Comparison of the American and English Rules by Plott, Charles R
193-225 Measuring Legal Change by Priest, George L
227-34 Why Litigants Disagree: A Comment on George Priest's "Measuring Legal Change." by Cooter, Robert
235-41 Conceptualizing Legal Change and Its Effects: A Comment on George Priest's "Measuring Legal Change." by Galanter, Marc
243-77 Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control by McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R
279-86 Political Control of Administrative Officials by Arnold, R Douglas
287-335 Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures by Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith
337-43 Comment: Alternative Rationales for Restrictive Procedures [Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures] by Fiorina, Morris P
345-50 The Concept of Information: A Comment on Gilligan and Krehbiel's "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees." by Shapiro, Martin
351-72 The Use of Hedonic Analysis for Certification and Damage Calculations in Class Action Complaints by Hartman, Raymond S & Doane, Michael J
373-95 An Organizational Coordination Model of Salesforce Compensation Plans: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test by John, George & Weiss, Allen M & Weitz, Barton
397-434 The Effects of Industry-Wide Price Regulation on Industrial Organization by Daughety, Andrew F & Forsythe, Robert
435-48 The Market for Corporate Control and the Market for Political Control by Wintrobe, Ronald
1987, Volume 3, Issue 1 1-25 Firm Heterogeneities and Cartelization Efforts in Domestic Crude Oil by Wiggins, Steven N & Libecap, Gary D
27-46 Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation by Polinsky, A Mitchell
47-67 Vertical Integration and Risk Reduction by Helfat, Constance E & Teece, David J
69-98 Bargaining and the by Heckathorn, Douglas D & Maser, Steven M
99-115 Volatile Interest Rates and the Divergence of Incentives in Mortgage Contracts by Mulherin, J Harold & Muller, Walter J, III
117-28 A Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation by Gallick, Edward C & Sisk, David E
129-39 Institutions for the Governance of Opportunism in International Trade by Yarbrough, Beth V & Yarbrough, Robert M
140-42 Identity and Cooperation: A Comment on Sen's Alternative Program [Goals, Commitment, and Identity] by Higgs, Robert
1986, Volume 2, Issue 2 181-214 Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations by Tirole, Jean
215-27 Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt by Vanberg, Viktor & Buchanan, James M
229-53 Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction by Schwartz, Alan
253-71 The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Last (?) Reply [The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer] [Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers] by Bebchuk, Lucian Arye
271-77 Bebchuk on Minimum Offer Periods by Schwartz, Alan
279-303 Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards by Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E
305-13 The Production of Information through Labor Market Contests by Gifford, Adam, Jr & Kenney, Roy W
315-37 Research Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis by Grossman, Gene M & Shapiro, Carl
339-49 Technology, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control by Baysinger, Barry D & Zardkoohi, Asghar
1986, Volume 2, Issue 1 1-32 The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement by Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L
33-51 Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power by Fiorina, Morris P
53-104 Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy by Kraakman, Reiner H
105-17 Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions by Mulherin, J Harold
119-30 A Theory of Status Organizations by Hansmann, Henry
131-61 Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives? by Rose-Ackerman, Susan
163-77 Limited Liability and the Development of the Business Corporation by Forbes, Kevin F
1985, Volume 1, Issue 2 225-83 Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle by Romano, Roberta
285-312 On Vertical Mergers by Spiller, Pablo T
313-40 Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law by Elliott, E Donald & Ackerman, Bruce A & Millian, John C
341-55 Goals, Commitment, and Identity by Sen, Amartya
357-74 Enforcing Rules on Oneself by Schelling, Thomas C
375-79 The Reasons for Being of Two Minds: A Comment on Schelling's "Enforcing Rules on Oneself." by Winston, Gordon C
381-83 Enforcing Rules on Oneself: Commentary by Burt, Robert A
385-98 The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy by Acheson, James M
1985, Volume 1, Issue 1 More pages of listings: 0 |1 |2 Access
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