A Theory of "Crying Wolf" : The Economics of Money Laundering Enforcement
AbstractThe article shows how excessive reporting, called "crying wolf", can dilute the information value of reports and how more reports can mean less information. Excessive reporting is investigated by undertaking the first formal analysis of money laundering enforcement. Banks monitor transactions and report suspicious activity to government agencies, which use these reports to identify investigation targets. Banks face fines should they fail to report money laundering. However, excessive fines force banks to report transactions which are less suspicious. The empirical evidence is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions. The model is used to suggest implementable corrective policy measures, such as decreasing fines and introducing reporting fees. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: email@example.com, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization.
Volume (Year): 27 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
Other versions of this item:
- ElÃ¶d TakÃ¡ts, 2007. "A Theory of "Crying Wolf": The Economics of Money Laundering Enforcement," IMF Working Papers 07/81, International Monetary Fund.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Brigitte Unger & Frans van Waarden, 2009. "Attempts to Dodge Drowning in Data. Rule- and Risk-Based Anti Money Laundering Policies Compared," Working Papers 09-19, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Gnutzmann, Hinnerk & McCarthy, Killian J. & Unger, Brigitte, 2010. "Dancing with the devil: Country size and the incentive to tolerate money laundering," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 244-252, September.
- Buscemi, Antonino & Yallwe, Alem Hagos, 2011.
"Money laundry and financial development,"
32458, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Buscemi, Antonino & Yallwe, Alem Hagos, 2011. "Money laundry and financial development," MPRA Paper 33089, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2011.
- Yallwe, Hagos Alem & Buscemi, Antonino, 2011. "Money laundry and financial development," MPRA Paper 32219, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schneider, Friedrich, 2010. "The (Hidden) Financial Flows of Terrorist and Organized Crime Organizations: A Literature Review and Some Preliminary Empirical Results," IZA Discussion Papers 4860, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Patrycja Chodnicka, 2012. "Geographical Risk Of Money Laundering In The European Banking System," Oeconomia Copernicana, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne Oddzial w Toruniu, Wydzial Nauk Ekonomicznych i Zarzadzania UMK, vol. 3, pages 103-123.
- Friedrich Schneider & Raul Caruso, 2011. "The (Hidden) Financial Flows of Terrorist and Transnational Crime Organizations: A Literature Review and Some Preliminary Empirical Results," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 52, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Raffaella Barone & Donato Masciandaro, 2011. "Organized crime, money laundering and legal economy: theory and simulations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 115-142, August.
- Friedrich Schneider, 2011. "The Financial Flows of the Transnational Crime: Some Preliminary Empirical Results," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 53, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.