Congestion Games And Potentials Reconsidered

Citations

Cited by:

1. Norde, Henk & Voorneveld, Mark, 2019. "Feasible best-response correspondences and quadratic scoring rules," SSE Working Paper Series in Economics 2019:2, Stockholm School of Economics.
2. Samir Sbabou & Hatem Smaoui & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Jeux de congestion finis à choix unique : Théorie, Equilibres, Applications -Calculs et Complexités-," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201303, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:17:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
4. Abderrahmane ZIAD & Samir SBABOU & Hatem SMAOUI, CEMOI, 2011. "Nonsymmetric singleton congestion games: case of two resources," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201113, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
5. Ryo Kawasaki & Hideo Konishi & Junki Yukawa, 2023. "Equilibria in bottleneck games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 649-685, September.
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6. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2007. "Congestion games revisited," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 57-83, September.
   • Nikolai S. Kukushkin, 2004. "Congestion Games Revisited," Game Theory and Information 0412010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Feb 2006.
7. Olivier Tercieux & Mark Voorneveld, 2010. "The cutting power of preparation," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 71(1), pages 85-101, February.
   • Tercieux, O.R.C. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "The Cutting Power of Preparation," Discussion Paper 2005-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Olivier Tercieux & Mark Voorneveld, 2010. "The cutting power of preparation," Post-Print halshs-00754467, HAL.
   • Tercieux, Olivier & Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "The cutting power of preparation," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 583, Stockholm School of Economics.
8. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2011. "Nonspecific Networking," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-27, February.
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9. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2018. "A universal construction generating potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 331-340.
   • Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2016. "A universal construction generating potential games," MPRA Paper 71664, University Library of Munich, Germany.
10. Voorneveld, Mark, 2019. "An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 316-321.
11. Sandholm, William H., 2001. "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
    • Sandholm,W.H., 1999. "Potential games with continuous player sets," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
12. Zhan Wang & Jinpeng Ma & Hongwei Zhang, 2023. "Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 8(1), pages 1-55, December.
13. Roughgarden, Tim & Tardos, Eva, 2004. "Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 389-403, May.
14. Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdait, 2010. "Quasicontinuity and Nash Equilibrium in Compact and Convex Games," Working Papers 2010-ECO-09, IESEG School of Management.
15. Tobias Harks & Max Klimm & Rolf Möhring, 2013. "Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 461-482, May.
16. Nikolai S. Kukushkin, 2008. "Potential games with NM utilities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(17), pages 1-7.
17. Voorneveld, Mark, 2019. "An elementary axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept," SSE Working Paper Series in Economics 2019:1, Stockholm School of Economics.
18. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 56-87, January.
19. Clempner, Julio B. & Poznyak, Alexander S., 2015. "Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 265(C), pages 911-927.
20. Ozan Candogan & Ishai Menache & Asuman Ozdaglar & Pablo A. Parrilo, 2011. "Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(3), pages 474-503, August.
21. Lina Mallozzi, 2013. "An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 21(3), pages 523-539, September.
22. Le Breton, Michel & Shapoval, Alexander & Weber, Shlomo, 2021. "A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 41-46.
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    • Le Breton, Michel & Shapoval, Alexander & Weber, Shlomo, 2020. "A Game-Theoretical Model of the Landscape Theory," TSE Working Papers 20-1113, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Michel Le Breton & Alexander Shapoval & Shlomo Weber, 2021. "A Game-theoretical Model of the Landscape Theory," Post-Print hal-03156677, HAL.
23. Samir Sbabou & Hatem Smaoui & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "A formula for Nash equilibria in monotone singleton congestion games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 334-339.
    • Abderrahmane ZIAD & Samir SBABOU & Hatem SMAOUI, CEMOI, 2011. "A formula for Nash equilibria in monotone singleton congestion games," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201114, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    • Samir Sbabou & Hatem Smaoui & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "A formula for Nash equilibria in monotone singleton congestion games," Post-Print halshs-00869876, HAL.
24. Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian, 2009. "On the Existence of Strong Nash Equilibria," Working Papers 2009-ECO-06, IESEG School of Management.
25. Milchtaich, Igal, 2006. "Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 321-346, November.
26. Nikolai S. Kukushkin, 2017. "Inseparables: exact potentials and addition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(2), pages 1176-1181.
27. Abderrahmane ZIAD & Samir SBABOU & Hatem SMAOUI, 2011. "Nash equilibria in nonsymmetric singleton congestion games with exact partition," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201115, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
28. Fatima Khanchouche & Samir Sbabou & Hatem Smaoui & Ziad Abderrahmane, 2023. "Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions: The Case of Two Resources, Computation and Algorithms. First version," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 2023-08, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.