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The Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC

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Cited by:

  1. Antonio M. Bento, Richard Klotz, and Joel R. Landry, 2015. "Are there Carbon Savings from US Biofuel Policies? The Critical Importance of Accounting for Leakage in Land and Fuel Markets," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
  2. Ramcharran, Harri, 2001. "OPEC's production under fluctuating oil prices: further test of the target revenue theory," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 667-681, November.
  3. Landry, Joel R. & Bento, Antonio M., 2020. "On the trade-offs of regulating multiple unpriced externalities with a single instrument: Evidence from biofuel policies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  4. Medel, Carlos, 2015. "Producers, Politicians, Warriors, and Forecasters: Who's Who in the Oil Market?," MPRA Paper 65298, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Ramcharran, Harri, 2002. "Oil production responses to price changes: an empirical application of the competitive model to OPEC and non-OPEC countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 97-106, March.
  6. Kyle Hyndman, 2004. "Status Quo Effects In Bargaining: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 285, Econometric Society.
  7. Wirl, Franz, 2009. "OPEC as a political and economical entity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 399-408, December.
  8. James M. Griffin, 2018. "The Saudi 2014 gambit: a counterfactual analysis," Mineral Economics, Springer;Raw Materials Group (RMG);Luleå University of Technology, vol. 31(1), pages 253-261, May.
  9. Wirl, Franz, 2008. "Why do oil prices jump (or fall)?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 1029-1043, March.
  10. Jose Noguera & Rowena A. Pecchenino, 2005. "Can a Cartel Fuel the Engine of Economic Development? OPEC and the macroeconomics of oil," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp280, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  11. Dibooglu, Sel & AlGudhea, Salim N., 2007. "All time cheaters versus cheaters in distress: An examination of cheating and oil prices in OPEC," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 292-310, September.
  12. Griffin, James M., 2007. "The Future of World Oil Prices: Some Keys to the Puzzle," 2007 NAAMIC Workshop IV: Contemporary Drivers of Integration 163898, North American Agrifood Market Integration Consortium (NAAMIC).
  13. Okullo, Samuel J. & Reynès, Frédéric, 2016. "Imperfect cartelization in OPEC," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 333-344.
  14. Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen, 2005. "What motivates membership in non-renewable resource cartels?: The case of OPEC," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 321-342, November.
  15. Celso Brunetti, Bahattin Buyuksahin, Michel A. Robe, and Kirsten R. Soneson, 2013. "OPEC "Fair Price" Pronouncements and the Market Price of Crude Oil," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4).
  16. Chen, Cuicui & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2018. "Collective action in an asymmetric world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 103-112.
  17. Robles Jack, 2011. "Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, April.
  18. Noguera, Jose & Pecchecnino, Rowena A., 2007. "OPEC and the international oil market: Can a cartel fuel the engine of economic development?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 187-199, February.
  19. Antonio Fernandois & Carlos A. Medel, 2020. "Geopolitical tensions, OPEC news, and the oil price: A granger causality analysis," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business, vol. 35(2), pages 57-90, October.
  20. Wirl, Franz, 2015. "Output adjusting cartels facing dynamic, convex demand under uncertainty: The case of OPEC," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 307-316.
  21. Parnes, Dror, 2019. "Heterogeneous noncompliance with OPEC's oil production cuts," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 289-300.
  22. Khalid Kisswani, 2014. "OPEC and political considerations when deciding on oil extraction," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 38(1), pages 96-118, January.
  23. Kisswani, Khalid M., 2016. "Does OPEC act as a cartel? Empirical investigation of coordination behavior," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 171-180.
  24. Berthod, Mathias & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2019. "On agreements in a nonrenewable resource market: A cooperative differential game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 23-39.
  25. Cologni, Alessandro & Manera, Matteo, 2014. "On the economic determinants of oil production," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 68-79.
  26. Tang, Linghui & Hammoudeh, Shawkat, 2002. "An empirical exploration of the world oil price under the target zone model," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 577-596, November.
  27. Lin, Boqiang & Omoju, Oluwasola E. & Okonkwo, Jennifer U., 2015. "Will disruptions in OPEC oil supply have permanent impact on the global oil market?," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 1312-1321.
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