OPEC and political considerations when deciding on oil extraction
AbstractTwo oil price shocks changed the pattern of cheap oil. The first was the Arab embargo on oil exports in 1973. Oil prices rose five fold. In 1978, the second was the fall of Shah Iran. Prices soared to $80-$100 a barrel in today‘s prices. In 1960, OPEC was established and since then it has been a considerable political and economical force in the oil market. Two thirds of the world‘s oil reserves belong to OPEC members. OPEC is accused of being responsible for most of the price increases due to their production cuts and market power. This paper provides a general framework to examine the role of OPEC in affecting oil prices through the extracted quantities. A mathematical model is developed to explore the objective function of OPEC, which includes economic and political considerations. The idea is that OPEC members consider both the political support of their citizens and profits when determining oil extraction rates. This support is represented by a ―harm function‖ which was added to the objective function of OPEC. The solution of the model lends some support for inclusion of this harm function, through which OPEC benefits from the cuts in production aimed at harming the western countries. For this harm function to be meaningful empirically, OPEC members should have a high harm indicator, αt. With high harm indicator values, OPEC harms itself financially. The results suggest that OPEC appears to be accepting considerable monetary setbacks to appease its citizens‘ taste for harming the West. At different discount rates, the monetary losses range from about 10-20%. Solving the mathematical model required estimation of the residual demand that OPEC faces plus the cost function that applies to OPEC production. This paper reports the results of these estimations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27030.
Date of creation: 11 Nov 2010
Date of revision:
OPEC; optimal control; cost estimation; demand estimation; resource economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
- C20 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - General
- Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
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