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Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Chiraz FEKI, 2016. "Information asymmetry and technical efficiency: Case of a panel of Tunisian insurance companies," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(4(609), W), pages 299-314, Winter.
  2. Puelz, Robert & Snow, Arthur, 1994. "Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 236-257, April.
  3. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  4. Thomas J. Miceli, 2020. "Trading in Information: On the Unlikely Correspondence Between Patents and Blackmail Law," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(4), pages 637-650, June.
  5. Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2014. "A Game Theoretic Foundation Of Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 399-422, May.
  6. Chiraz FEKI, 2016. "Information asymmetry and technical efficiency: Case of a panel of Tunisian insurance companies," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(4(609), W), pages 299-314, Winter.
  7. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  8. Ana B. Ania & Thomas Tröger & Achim Wambach, 1998. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets," Vienna Economics Papers vie9808, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  9. Kifmann, Mathias, 2002. "Community rating in health insurance and different benefit packages," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 719-737, September.
  10. Ania, Ana B. & Troger, Thomas & Wambach, Achim, 2002. "An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 153-184, August.
  11. Gerhard Clemenz & Mona Ritthaler, 1992. "Credit markets with asymmetric information : a survey," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 12-26, Spring.
  12. Amy Finkelstein, 2002. "When Can Partial Public Insurance Produce Pareto Improvements?," NBER Working Papers 9035, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Dionne, Georges, 1981. "Le risque moral et la sélection adverse : une revue critique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 57(2), pages 193-224, avril-jui.
  14. Belli, Paolo, 2001. "How adverse selection affects the health insurance market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2574, The World Bank.
  15. Zink, Helmut, 1995. "The role of market intransparency in insurance market models," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 335-359, June.
  16. Asheim, Geir B. & Nilssen, Tore, 1996. "Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1717-1736, December.
  17. van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M. & van Vliet, ReneC. J. A., 1995. "Consumer information surplus and adverse selection in competitive health insurance markets: An empirical study," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 149-169, June.
  18. Gabriele Mazzolini, 2020. "The Economic Consequences of Accidents at Work," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 82(5), pages 1068-1093, October.
  19. Henry Tosi, 2008. "Quo Vadis? Suggestions for future corporate governance research," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(2), pages 153-169, May.
  20. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
  21. Encinosa, William, 2001. "A comment on Neudeck and Podczeck's "adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets"," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 667-673, July.
  22. Theodoros M. Diasakos & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2011. "Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 215, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  23. Nathalie Fombaron & Carine Milcent, 2007. "The distortionary effect of health insurance on health demand," Working Papers halshs-00587713, HAL.
  24. Gabriele Mazzolini, 2014. "The economic consequences of accidents at work," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def015, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  25. Diasakos, Theodoros M. & Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2018. "(Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 159-186.
  26. Finkelstein, Amy, 2004. "Minimum standards, insurance regulation and adverse selection: evidence from the Medigap market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2515-2547, December.
  27. Innes, Robert, 1987. "Asymmetric Information And The Entrepreneurial Firm: Capital Structure, Investment And Government Intervention," Working Papers 225813, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  28. Felipe Balmaceda, 2004. "Uncertainty, Pay for Performance and Adverse Selection in a Competitive Labor Market," Documentos de Trabajo 196, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  29. Arthur Snow, 2009. "On the Possibility of Profitable Self‐Selection Contracts in Competitive Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 249-259, June.
  30. Neudeck, Werner & Podczeck, Konrad, 1996. "Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 387-408, August.
  31. W. Henry Chiu & Edi Karni, 1998. "Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 806-827, August.
  32. Kraus, Daniel, 2010. "When do we have borrower or credit volume rationing in competitive credit market with imperfect information?," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 117, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
  33. repec:ctc:serie1:def15 is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Agnès Couffinhal, 2000. "De l'antisélection à la sélection en assurance santé : pour un changement de perspective," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 142(1), pages 101-121.
  35. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Doherty, Neil, 2012. "Adverse selection in insurance contracting," Working Papers 12-8, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
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