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Citations for "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium"

by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K.

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  1. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
  2. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 473-478, June.
  3. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  4. S. Nageeb Ali, 2011. "Learning Self-Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 857-893.
  5. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2003. "Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 03-A009, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  6. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief Based Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000975, David K. Levine.
  7. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2000. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 1322, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jul 2001.
  8. Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," ESE Discussion Papers 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  9. Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196330, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Mario Gilli, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2084, David K. Levine.
  11. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  12. Perea, Andres, 2002. "A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 322-338, August.
  13. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.
  14. Lupia, Arthur & Levine, Adam Seth & Zharinova, Natasha, 2008. "When Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Benefits, Costs, and an Application to Jury Theorems," MPRA Paper 8643, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  16. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
  17. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Games with Small Forgetfulness," Discussion Papers 1273, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Perea, Andrés, 2014. "Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
  19. Sheng-Chieh Huang & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 309-329, February.
  20. Lupia, Arthur & Zharinova, Natasha & Levine, Adam Seth, 2007. "Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors," MPRA Paper 1618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.