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Information Sharing in Contests

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
  2. Kyung Hwan Baik & Sang-Kee Kim, 2020. "Observable versus unobservable R&D investments in duopolies," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 37-66, June.
  3. Feng, Xin, 2020. "Information disclosure on the contest mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 148-156.
  4. Ford, Weixing & Lian, Zeng & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie, 2020. "Information sharing in a contest game with group identity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  5. Sharma, Priyanka & Wagman, Liad, 2020. "Advertising and Voter Data in Asymmetric Political Contests," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
  6. Xin Feng, 2023. "Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 401-421, June.
  7. Lu, Jingfeng & Ma, Hongkun & Wang, Zhewei, 2023. "Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
  8. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2018. "To Deter Or To Moderate? Alliance Formation In Contests With Incomplete Information," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1447-1463, July.
  9. Kyung Hwan Baik & Dongryul Lee, 2020. "Decisions of Duopoly Firms on Sharing Information on Their Delegation Contracts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(1), pages 145-165, August.
  10. Wu, Zenan & Zheng, Jie, 2017. "Information sharing in private value lottery contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 36-40.
  11. Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2021. "Reputation for Toughness," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-16, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  12. Kai Konrad, 2012. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 679-693, June.
  13. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2017. "The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(4), pages 925-942, April.
  14. Andrzej Kwiatkowski, 2010. "Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 243, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
  15. Yangguang Huang & Ming He, 2021. "Structural Analysis Of Tullock Contests With An Application To U.S. House Of Representatives Elections," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1011-1054, August.
  16. Philipp Denter & John Morgan & Dana Sisak, 2022. "Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 529-580, February.
  17. Barbieri, Stefano & Kovenock, Dan & Malueg, David A. & Topolyan, Iryna, 2019. "Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link”," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 382-411.
  18. Marco Serena, 2017. "Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  19. Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 147-165.
  20. Denter, Philipp & Morgan, John & Sisak, Dana, 2011. ""Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests," Economics Working Paper Series 1128, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  21. Sung-Hoon Park & Chad E. Settle, 2023. "Asymmetric Reimbursement and Contingent Fees in Environmental Conflicts: Observable vs. Unobservable Contracts," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-10, July.
  22. Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  23. Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 135-166.
  24. Jingfeng Lu & Hongkun Ma & Zhe Wang, 2018. "Ranking Disclosure Policies In All‐Pay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1464-1485, July.
  25. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
  26. Fu, Qiang & Jiao, Qian & Lu, Jingfeng, 2014. "Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 376-380.
  27. Marco Serena, 2022. "Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants’ types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 763-792, October.
  28. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Information Disclosure in Contests with Endogenous Entry: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5128-5150, November.
  29. Cho, Myeonghwan & Jun, Byung-hill, 2013. "Information sharing with competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 81-84.
  30. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  32. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  33. Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021. "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 33-64, June.
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