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Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment

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Cited by:

  1. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
  3. Christina E. Bannier & Frank Heinemann, 2005. "Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 374-391, September.
  4. Allsopp, Louise, 2002. "Common knowledge and the value of defending a fixed exchange rate--an explanation of a currency crisis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 67-79, March.
  5. Chanelle Duley & Prasanna Gai, 2020. "When the penny doesn't drop - Macroeconomic tail risk and currency crises," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 520, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  6. Mankiw, N. Gregory & Reis, Ricardo, 2010. "Imperfect Information and Aggregate Supply," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 183-229, Elsevier.
  7. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2014. "Experiments on Monetary Policy and Central Banking," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments in Macroeconomics, volume 17, pages 167-227, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
  8. Peter Ockenfels & Rosemarie Nagel & Frank Heinemann, 2002. "Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information," FMG Discussion Papers dp416, Financial Markets Group.
  9. Todd Keister, 2009. "Expectations And Contagion In Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(3), pages 991-1012, August.
  10. Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack, 2012. "Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 97-116.
  11. Lioudmila Savtchenko, 2010. "Foreign devaluation as a coordinating device of heterogeneous investors: A game‐theoretic analysis of financial contagion," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(2), pages 195-204, June.
  12. Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 429-450, December.
  13. Neeman Zvika & Orosel Gerhard Oskar, 2002. "Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, August.
  14. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2014. "Experimental evidence on the ‘insidious’ illiquidity risk," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 315-323.
  15. John Duffy, 2009. "Equilibrium Selection in Static and Dynamic Entry Games," Working Paper 376, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Dec 2011.
  16. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2011. "Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk," Post-Print hal-00607867, HAL.
  17. Ing-Haw Cheng & Alice Hsiaw, 2022. "Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 761-803, November.
  18. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
  19. Ioannou, Christos A. & Makris, Miltiadis, 2017. "An experimental investigation of Poisson Coordination games," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1506, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  20. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Erler, Alexander & Bauer, Christian & Herz, Bernhard, 2015. "To intervene, or not to intervene: Monetary policy and the costs of currency crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 432-456.
  22. Hanjoon M. Jung & Meng‐Yu Liang & C.C. Yang, 2022. "How much should we fund the IRS?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(1), pages 120-139, February.
  23. Christian Hellwig, 2000. "Public Information, Private Information and the Multiplicity of Equilibrium in Co-ordination of Games," FMG Discussion Papers dp361, Financial Markets Group.
  24. Leila Ali, 2012. "Flexibility: Stability's Best Friend in Non-transparent Countries?," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2), pages 247-264, December.
  25. Mahdi Yazdani & Mohammad Nikzad, 2021. "Output Losses from Currency Crises and the Role of Central Bank," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 10(3), pages 79-97.
  26. Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel, 2001. "Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis," Vienna Economics Papers vie0103, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  27. Steiner, Jakub, 2008. "Coordination cycles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 308-327, May.
  28. Naqvi, Nadeem & Neumärker, Bernhard & Pech, Gerald, 2012. "The rule of law and sustainability of the constitution: The case of tax evasion," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2012, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
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