Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
AbstractNo Abstract Available.Frank Heinemann link: http://www.sfm.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/heinemann/heinemann.html Rosemarie Nagel link: http://www.econ.upf.es/cgi-bin/whois?01280
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Date of creation: Jul 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2002. "Speculative attacks and financial architecture: experimental analysis of coordination games with public and private information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24935, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Christina E. Bannier, 2003. "Privacy or Publicity - Who Drives the Wheel?," Game Theory and Information 0309006, EconWPA.
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