We analyze the behavior of foreign banks who sequentially provide credit to finance projects in an emerging market. The foreign banks are exposed to both micro-economic risks and the macro-economic risk of a currency crisis, and there are no bailout guarantees. Nevertheless, we show that it is often the case that banks provide too much credit too easily and that this behavior may precipitate the onset of a currency crisis. We demonstrate how the imposition of capital controls in the form of taxes and subsidies on foreign investment may improve the situation. Whereas most of the literature explains currency crises as the consequence of causes that lie within the debtor countries, the general message of our paper may be interpreted as placing part of the blame on the international financial community as well.
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Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number
0103.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment
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