Environmental Tax Reform: Efficiency and Political Feasibility
AbstractCommand-and-control measures, despite their inefficiencies, are still the standard in environmental policy. This might be due to the fact that command-and-control instruments prevent monetary redistribution between sectors and households and leave property rights on remaining pollution with the emittents. The present paper interprets the no-redistribution policy as a political constraint and investigates on more efficient alternatives to command-and- control, using a computable general equilibrium model for Switzerland. Simulation results render schemes that refund environmental tax revenues by a sector-by-sector-subsidy on labor or output as welfare enhancing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 013.
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Environmental tax reform; price-standard-approach; public choice; computable general equilibrium model;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
- H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2000-05-22 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2000-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2000-05-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2000-05-22 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2000-05-22 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2000-05-22 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2000-05-22 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2000-05-22 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Open Access publications from Tilburg University
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