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You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs: the impact of venture capitalists on executive turnover

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  • Heger, Diana
  • Tykvová, Tereza

Abstract

We present evidence on venture capitalists? (VCs) impact on turnover of executives for a sample of nearly 47,000 German high-tech start-ups between 1995 and 2004. We confirm that the presence of VCs increases the probability of a change in the initial executive team. Additionally, we take a closer look on the subsample of venturebacked firms. We find that a small distance between the VCs and the companies they finance and a larger total stake in the company owned by VCs increase the probability of changes in the initial executive teams.

Suggested Citation

  • Heger, Diana & Tykvová, Tereza, 2007. "You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs: the impact of venture capitalists on executive turnover," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-003, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5490
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Venture Capital; Executive Turnover;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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