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Lessons from the EU effort sharing decision for supranational climate cooperation: A firm-level analysis

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  • Gavarda, Claire
  • Diethelm, Lukas

Abstract

As an example of supranational climate policy coordination for sectors not covered by carbon trading, the European Effort Sharing Decision set national targets for emission reductions for the time period 2013-2020. Member States were free to decide the national policies to implement to achieve these objectives. This is the first quantification of the impact this regulation had on the emissions of the corresponding firms. We exploit the differences along three variables: a national-level treatment intensity, an exposure index defined at the firm level and a time dimension (before or after the introduction of the policy). We find that, even in countries with no stringent target, emissions from exposed firms tended to decrease more than emissions from non-exposed firms. In addition, each percentage point increase in the stringency of the treatment leads to a 6.1% reduction in emissions for an average exposed firm. This provides interesting insights for other supranational climate agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Gavarda, Claire & Diethelm, Lukas, 2022. "Lessons from the EU effort sharing decision for supranational climate cooperation: A firm-level analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-042, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:22042
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    carbon emissions; effort sharing decision; firms; climate policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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