Efficiency, Compensation, and Discrimination: What is at Stake When Implementing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme?
Abstract
In 2005, an EU-wide emissions trading scheme covering major CO2 producing sites shall come into power. The key objective of the trading scheme is to promote cost-efficiency of carbon reduction within the EU. We identify policy-relevant tradeoffs between overall efficiency, compensation and competitive neutrality which arise in the concrete implementation of the EU emissions trading scheme through National Allocation Plans. --Download Info
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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 03-73.Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:1683
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Related research
Keywords: emissions trading; allowance allocation; competition; National Allocation Plans; computable general equilibrium;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Christoph Böhringer & Andreas Lange, 2005. "Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(3), pages 563-581, 09.
- Bohringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2005.
"On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2041-2055, November.
- Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2003. "On the Design of Optimal Grandfathering Schemes for Emission Allowances," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-08, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Böhringer, Christoph & Jensen, Jesper & Rutherford, Thomas F., 1999. "Energy market projections and differentiated carbon abatement in the European Union," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-11, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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