Antitrust immunity for airline alliances
AbstractThe market developments in international air transportation have led to the dominance of three global airline alliances - Star, SkyTeam and oneworld. At the same time, members of these alliances receive increasingly more freedom in coordinating various aspects of joint operations, including scheduling and pricing decisions, as well as the right to form revenue-sharing joint ventures in international markets. Although the significant consumer benefits generated by airline cooperation are undisputed, the recent developments raise antitrust concerns. Against this background, the paper compares the key competitive effects of airline alliances and antitrust immunity with the economic lines of reasoning in recent policy actions to develop recommendations for a full-fledged assessment of antitrust immunity for airline alliances. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 10-080.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
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- Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hüschelrath, 2013.
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