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Typen und Indizes demokratischer Regime: Eine Analyse des Präsidentialismus- und des Veto-Spieler-Ansatzes

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  • Fuchs, Dieter

Abstract

Die Demokratie wird heute nahezu weltweit als die einzig legitime Form einer politischen Herrschaftsordnung angesehen. Angesichts des Sachverhaltes, dass diese unterschiedlich institutionalisiert werden kann, stellt sich die Frage, welcher Typ der Demokratie der bessere oder der schlechtere ist. Diese Frage kann normativ beantwortet werden, aber auch auf der Grundlage unterschiedlicher Performanzen, die empirisch ermittelt werden können. Letzteres setzt wiederum eine angemessene theoretische Konzeptualisierung von Typen demokratischer Regime voraus und die Operationalisierung dieser Typen in Form von Indizes. Das ist das Thema dieser Analyse. Vor dem Hintergrund eines theoretischen Bezugsrahmens werden verschiedene Typen und Indizes demokratischer Regime miteinander verglichen, die in der gegenwärtigen vergleichenden und empirischen Demokratieforschung eine Rolle spielen. Diese werden entweder dem Präsidentialismus- Parlamentarismus-Ansatz oder dem Veto-Spieler-Ansatz zugeordnet. Die Analyse impliziert also zugleich einen Vergleich dieser beiden grundlegenden Ansätze der Bildung von Typen und Indizes demokratischer Regime.

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  • Fuchs, Dieter, 2000. "Typen und Indizes demokratischer Regime: Eine Analyse des Präsidentialismus- und des Veto-Spieler-Ansatzes," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions and Social Change FS III 00-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbisc:fsiii00205
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