IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/wzbisc/fsiii01203.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Types and indices of democratic regimes

Author

Listed:
  • Fuchs, Dieter

Abstract

Today democracy is seen as the only legitimate form of government almost all over the world. That it can be institutionalized differently leads to the question which kind of democracy might be better or worse. This question can be answered normatively, but also on the basis of different performances that can be determined empirically. The latter requires an adequate theoretical conceptualization of types of democratic regimes and the operationalization of these types in the form of indices. This is the subject of the analysis. Types and indices of democratic regimes that figure in the current comparative and empirical research on democracy are compared against the background of a theoretical framework. They are categorized as presidentialism-parliamentarism-approaches or veto-playerapproaches. Thereby, the analysis implies a comparison of these two basic approaches to the construction of types and indices of democratic regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Fuchs, Dieter, 2001. "Types and indices of democratic regimes," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions and Social Change FS III 01-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbisc:fsiii01203
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/49008/1/344065324.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sartori, Giovanni, 1970. "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 1033-1053, December.
    2. Fuchs, Dieter, 1999. "Soziale Integration und politische Institutionen in modernen Gesellschaften," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions and Social Change FS III 99-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    3. Tsebelis, George, 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 591-608, September.
    4. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521429900.
    5. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521419628.
    6. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 289-325, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fuchs, Dieter, 2000. "Typen und Indizes demokratischer Regime: Eine Analyse des Präsidentialismus- und des Veto-Spieler-Ansatzes," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions and Social Change FS III 00-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Thomas H. Hammond & Christopher K. Butler, 2003. "Some Complex Answers to the Simple Question ‘Do Institutions Matter?’," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(2), pages 145-200, April.
    3. Gary Goertz & Tony Hak & Jan Dul, 2013. "Ceilings and Floors," Sociological Methods & Research, , vol. 42(1), pages 3-40, February.
    4. Pablo T. Spiller, 2003. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 281-306, October.
    5. André Kaiser, 1997. "Types of Democracy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 9(4), pages 419-444, October.
    6. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto Stein, 2010. "Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs- An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy," Research Department Publications 4660, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    7. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto H. Stein, 2008. "Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?," Research Department Publications 4593, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    8. Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller & Ernesto Stein, 2003. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes. An Intertemporal Transactions Framework," Working Papers 59, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2003.
    9. Marcelin, Isaac & Stephen, Sheryl-Ann K. & Fanta, Fassil & Tecklezion, Mussie, 2019. "Political regimes, investment and electoral uncertainty," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 580-599.
    10. Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen & Dominique Oehrli & Adrian Vatter, 2021. "Do governments delay the implementation of parliamentary requests? Examining time variation in implementing legislative requests in Switzerland," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 54(3), pages 663-690, September.
    11. B. Heller, William & P. Kyriacou, Andreas & Roca-Sagalés, Oriol, 2014. "Legislative Vetoes and Corruption: The Effect of Formal Checks on Governance," MPRA Paper 61651, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Mariano Tommasi & Carlos Scartascini & Ernesto Stein, 2014. "Veto players and policy adaptability: An intertemporal perspective," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(2), pages 222-248, April.
    13. Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "The Institutions of Regulation," Working Papers 67, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2004.
    14. Mícheál O’Keeffe & Alessio Terzi, 2015. "The political economy of financial crisis policy," Working Papers 888, Bruegel.
    15. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto H. Stein, 2008. "Un Enfoque Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?," Research Department Publications 4594, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    16. Toke Aidt & Francesco Giovannoni, 2011. "Critical decisions and constitutional rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 219-268, July.
    17. Josep M. Colomer, 2005. "Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline," Economics Working Papers 817, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    18. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Constitutions and Economic Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 75-98, Winter.
    19. Fuchs, Dieter, 1999. "Soziale Integration und politische Institutionen in modernen Gesellschaften," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions and Social Change FS III 99-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    20. Cingolani, Luciana & Crombrugghe, Denis de, 2012. "Exploring the panel components of the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD)," MERIT Working Papers 2012-037, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbisc:fsiii01203. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/wzbbbde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.