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Economic Integration and Local Tax Mimicking

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  • Holzmann, Carolin
  • von Schwerin, Axel

Abstract

This paper provides empirical evidence for tax mimicking among unicipalities by exploiting a quasi-experiment in the German local fiscal equalization scheme. We show for the metropolitan area FrankfurtRheinMain that, besides neighborhood, the degree of economic integration of municipalities determines the interdependency among their tax policies. As the metropolitan area spreads across municipalities located in the two German federal states, Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate, we can show that Rhineland-Palatine municipalities statistically significantly respond in their local tax rates to an exogenous change in the Hessian local fiscal equalization scheme. However, we find tax rate interdependency only for Rhineland-Palatine metropolitan municipalities which are arguably strongly economically integrated with Hessian metropolitan municipalities. The results suggest that regional economic integration is a key determinant for tax mimicking.

Suggested Citation

  • Holzmann, Carolin & von Schwerin, Axel, 2015. "Economic Integration and Local Tax Mimicking," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112893, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112893
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Lenk, Thomas & Rudolph, Hans-Joachim, 2004. "Die kommunalen Finanzausgleichssysteme in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Der Ausgleich zwischen Finanzbedarf und Finanzkraft," Arbeitspapiere des Lehrstuhls Finanzwissenschaft 27, University of Leipzig, Institute of Public Finance and Public Management.
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    Cited by:

    1. Blesse, Sebastian & Martin, Thorsten, 2015. "Let's stay in touch - evidence on the role of social learning in local tax interactions," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-081, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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