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Basel III and CEO compensation in banks: Pay structures as a regulatory signal

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  • Eufinger, Christian
  • Gill, Andrej

Abstract

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and shareholders to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown to be a difficult task during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Eufinger, Christian & Gill, Andrej, 2013. "Basel III and CEO compensation in banks: Pay structures as a regulatory signal," SAFE Working Paper Series 9, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewp:9
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2231964
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos A. Arango & Oscar M. Valencia, 2015. "Macro-Prudential Policy under Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility," Borradores de Economia 878, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    2. Carlos Arango & Oscar Valencia, 2015. "Macro-prudential Policies, Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility," IHEID Working Papers 06-2015, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Basel III; capital regulation; compensation; leverage; risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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