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Agent and Broker Intermediaries in Insurance Markets -- An Empirical Analysis of Market Outcomes

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  • Eckardt, Martina

Abstract

Insurance markets are characterized by profound market imperfections. Insurance intermediaries reduce transaction costs and information asymmetries. From transaction cost economics, agency theory, and law and economics literature the hypothesis is derived that insurance brokers may provide more high-quality information and advisory services which are better suited for the needs of the consumers than insurance agents. Empirical tests for German insurance intermediaries confirm this thesis. But there are also findings that structural factors like firm size, employment structure and degree of specialization may outweigh the incentives set by different legal settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Eckardt, Martina, 2002. "Agent and Broker Intermediaries in Insurance Markets -- An Empirical Analysis of Market Outcomes," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 34, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:roswps:34
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    2. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    3. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martina Eckardt & Solvig Räthke‐Döppner, 2010. "The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services—Empirical Evidence for Germany," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 667-701, September.
    2. Tajudeen Olalekan Yusuf, 2011. "Brokers' incentives and conflicts of interest in the control of opportunism," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 12(3), pages 168-181, May.
    3. Miguel Angel Latorre Guillem, 2020. "The Customer Orientation Service of Spanish Brokers in the Insurance Industry: The Advisory Service of the Insurance Distribution Channel Bancassurance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(7), pages 1-22, April.
    4. Trigo Gamarra, Lucinda, 2007. "Does the product quality hypothesis hold true? Service quality differences between independent and exclusive insurance agents," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 76, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    5. Jiří Šindelář & Petr Budinský, 2018. "Agent-zákazník problém v distribuci finančních produktů [Agent-Principal Problem in Financial Distribution]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2018(4), pages 491-507.
    6. von Walter, Benedikt & Hess, Thomas, 2005. "Content-Intermediation: Konzept und Anwendungsgebiet," Working Papers 5/2005, University of Munich, Munich School of Management, Institute for Information Systems and New Media.
    7. Eckardt, Martina, 2007. "Does signaling work in markets for information services? An empirical investigation for insurance intermediaries in Germany," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 77, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    8. Benjamin L. Collier & Marc A. Ragin, 2020. "The Influence of Sellers on Contract Choice: Evidence from Flood Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(2), pages 523-557, June.
    9. Dan Constantin Dănuleţiu & Adina Elena Dănuleţiu, 2011. "Trends And Challenges Of Romanian Brokerage Insurance Market," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 2(13), pages 1-24.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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