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How politics shaped modern banking in early modern England: Rethinking the nature of representative democracy, public debt, and modern banking

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  • Kim, Jongchul

Abstract

The recent sovereign debt crisis raises a debate on whether the cancelation of sovereign debt is compatible with democracy. Scholars opposed to the cancelation of sovereign debt refer to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, in which the British government began to make the people as a whole liable for the obligations incurred by their government. These scholars argue that this commitment formed the basis of the development of the financial system. This paper criticizes this argument by identifying the intrinsic contradictions of representative democracy, public debt, and modern banking in early modern England, contradictions that were incompatible with the well-being and democracy of a community. It further examines how the contradictions of representative democracy and public debt contributed to the evolution of modern banking at the time.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Jongchul, 2012. "How politics shaped modern banking in early modern England: Rethinking the nature of representative democracy, public debt, and modern banking," MPIfG Discussion Paper 12/11, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:1211
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