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Alternative Liberalisierungsmodelle für die Stromwirtschaft: Eine komparative Institutionenanalyse

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  • Kumkar, Lars

Abstract

Ein Jahr nach Inkrafttreten der deutschen Energierechtsnovelle sind die Konturen der zukünftigen Strommarktregulierung noch zu weiten Teilen ungeklärt. Vor diesem aktuellen wirtschaftspolitischem Hintergrund wird in diesem Papier die Frage nach einer sachgerechten Ausrichtung der Regulierungspolitik für die Stromwirtschaft diskutiert. Aufgabe dieses Papiers ist die komparative Betrachtung alternativer Modelle einer partiell deregulierten Stromwirtschaft. Diskutiert werden vier Modelle: (i) Das "Alleinabnehmermodell", das sich in der europäischen Stromrichtlinie, aber auch in zahlreichen U.S.-Bundesstaaten wiederfindet, (ii) das "Modell der spezifischen Durchleitungsrechte", wie es in der europäischen Stromrichtlinie definiert wird sowie auf der Bundesebene der Vereinigten Staaten eingerichtet wurde, (iii) das "Poolmodell", wie es in England und Wales implementiert wurde, und (iv) das "Common-Carrier-Modell", Richtschnur der norwegischen, schwedischen und finnischen sowie der kalifornischen Reformen.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumkar, Lars, 1999. "Alternative Liberalisierungsmodelle für die Stromwirtschaft: Eine komparative Institutionenanalyse," Kiel Working Papers 928, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:928
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simon, Herbert A, 1978. "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 1-16, May.
    2. Anne E. Peck, 1985. "Futures Markets: Their Economic Role," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 968570, September.
    3. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kumkar, Lars, 1999. "Zur zukünftigen Regulierungspolitik für die deutsche Stromwirtschaft," Kiel Working Papers 929, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Christian von Hirschhausen & Petra Opitz, 2001. "Power Utility Re-regulation in East European and CIS Transformation Countries (1990-1999): An Institutional Interpretation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 246, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    3. von Hirschhausen, Christian R. & Opitz, Petra, 2001. "Power utility re-regulation in East European and CIS transformation countries (1990 - 1999): An institutional interpretation," Discussion Papers 2001/7, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations

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