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Strategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetz

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  • Sander, Birgit

Abstract

Governments may draft contracts with market agents for allocating subsidies and pursuing specific policy goals. Contract enforcement via binding commitments is difficult, however, when exogenous (environmental) and endogenous (behavioural) risks interact. Analyzing the old debt compromise in east German housing, it results that a sophisticated design of contractual incompleteness may provide a reasonable safeguard against opportunistic behaviour. Yet it involves considerable costs and still does not guarantee that policy goals are achieved. The crucial policy question is if contracts can be drafted without creating a one-sided holdup potential or if governments should not co-operate with market agents but commit to policy rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Sander, Birgit, 1998. "Strategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetz," Kiel Working Papers 901, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:901
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sander, Birgit, 1994. "Anpassungsprozesse in der ostdeutschen Wohnungswirtschaft: Analyse und Bewertung," Kiel Discussion Papers 224/225, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-932, September.
    5. Huberman, Gur & Kahn, Charles M., 1988. "Strategic renegotiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 117-121.
    6. Kumkar, Lars, 1998. "Privatwirtschaftliche Koordinierungsstrukturen in vertikal strukturierten Industrien: Eine Analyse der Stromwirtschaft auf Grundlage der neuen Institutionenökonomik," Kiel Working Papers 873, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General

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