Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Rethinking Global Climate Change Governance

Contents:

Author Info

  • Barrett, Scott
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper explains why the approach taken so far to mitigate global climate change has failed. The central reason is an inability to enforce targets and timetables. Current proposals recommending even stricter emission limits will not help unless they are able to address the enforcement deficit. Trade restrictions are one means for doing so, but trade restrictions pose new problems, particularly if they are applied to enforce economy-wide emission limitation agreements. This paper sketches a different approach that unpacks the climate problem, addressing different gases and sectors using different instruments. It also explains how a failure to address the climate problem fundamentally will only create incentives for different kinds of responses, posing different challenges for climate change governance --

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2008-31
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/27467/1/dp2008-31.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 2008-31.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7407

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel
    Phone: +49 431 8814-1
    Fax: +49 431 8814528
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.economics-ejournal.org/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Climate change; Kyoto protocol; enforcement; trade restrictions; R&D;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Steffen Kallbekken & Jon Hovi, 2007. "The price of non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The remarkable case of Norway," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-15, March.
    2. Martin L. Weitzman, 2007. "A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 703-724, September.
    3. William D. Nordhaus, 2007. "A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 686-702, September.
    4. Barrett, Scott, 2005. "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199286096, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Mehdi Abbas, 2011. "Carbon border adjustement, trade and climate governance : issues for OPEC economies," Post-Print, HAL halshs-00617923, HAL.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7407. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.