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Spurious middlemen in corrupt transactions

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  • Bayar, Güzin

Abstract

To solve the corruption problem, its root causes should first be diagnosed and factors supporting it should be determined. One of the important facilitators of corrupt transactions are intermediaries, who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby increasing corruption. Even worse, there are 'spurious' intermediaries who obtain bribes from public services by pretending they can ensure a service is completed even though they have no such influence over the issue. This deception may continue even if the officer providing the public service in question is honest. The simple game theoretical model formulated in this article tries to capture the mechanisms behind such a deception. From the solutions of the model, some policy recommendations to prevent such a process from occurring are derived.

Suggested Citation

  • Bayar, Güzin, 2014. "Spurious middlemen in corrupt transactions," Economics Discussion Papers 2014-26, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201426
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hasker, Kevin & Okten, Cagla, 2008. "Intermediaries and corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 103-115, July.
    2. Manion, Melanie, 1996. "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 167-195, April.
    3. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sokolovska, Olena & Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2015. "Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis," MPRA Paper 66423, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2015.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; spurious middlemen; game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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