The Effects of Gasoline Price Regulations: Experimental Evidence
AbstractEconomic theory suggests that gasoline retail markets are prone to collusive behavior. Oligopoly market structures prevail, market interactions occur frequently, prices are highly transparent, and demand is rather inelastic. A recent sector inquiry in Germany backed suspicions of tacit collusion and suggested to adopt regulatory pricing rules for gas stations similar to those implemented in Austria, parts of Australia, Luxembourg or parts of Canada. In order to increase consumer welfare these rules either restrict the number of price changes per day or they limit the mark‐up for gasoline retail prices. As theoretical predictions about the impact of these measures are mixed and empirical studies rare, we analyze the effects, using an experimental gasoline market in the lab. Our results reveal that two of the suggested rules rather decrease consumer welfare: The Austrian rule which only allows one price increase per day (while price cuts are always possible) and the Luxembourg rule which introduces a maximum markup for retailers. While no rule tends to induce lower retail prices, the Western Australian rule which allows at most one daily price change (no matter whether up or down) does at least not harm consumers. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) in its series DICE Discussion Papers with number 47.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Gasoline Prices; Fuel Prices; Experimental Gasoline Market; Fuel Price Regulation; Retail Price Regulation; Gas Stations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L71 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
- L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
- L88 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Government Policy
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-04-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2012-04-10 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-04-10 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MKT-2012-04-10 (Marketing)
- NEP-REG-2012-04-10 (Regulation)
- NEP-TRE-2012-04-10 (Transport Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Siegfried Berninghaus & Michael Hesch & Andreas Hildenbrand, 2012. "Zur Wirkung regulatorischer Preiseingriffe auf dem Tankstellenmarkt," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 46-50, January.
- Deck, Cary A. & Wilson, Bart J., 2008. "Experimental gasoline markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 134-149, July.
- Obradovits, Martin, 2014.
"Austrian-style gasoline price regulation: How it may backfire,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 33-45.
- Obradovits, Martin, 2012. "Austrian-style gasoline price regulation: How it may backfire," MPRA Paper 42529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dewenter, Ralf & Heimeshoff, Ulrich, 2012. "Less pain at the pump? The effects of regulatory interventions in retail gasoline markets," DICE Discussion Papers 51, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
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