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Trade, Trust And The Territoriality Of The Law

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  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
  • Neunzig, Alexander R.
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    Abstract

    In this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT). -- In diesem Paper wird untersucht, inwiefern Vertrauen die durch die Territorialität des Rechts verursachten vertraglichen Risiken mildern kann, wie effektiv Vertrauen ist, und welcherart seine Auswirkungen auf die sequentielle Struktur des Handels ist. Das Paper stellt einen Beitrag zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik internationaler Transaktionen dar (NIIT) dar.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 97-05.

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    Date of creation: 1997
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:9705

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    Related research

    Keywords: international contract enforcment; trust game; bounded rationality;

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    1. Pomery, John, 1984. "Uncertainty in trade models," Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 419-465 Elsevier.
    2. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June.
    3. Clay, Karen, 1997. "Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 202-31, April.
    4. Kronman, Anthony T, 1985. "Contract Law and the State of Nature," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 5-32, Spring.
    5. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
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