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Europäischer Verbraucherschutz - Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment

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  • Kirstein, Roland
  • Kirstein, Annette

Abstract

Wir nutzen die Ergebnisse eines Experiments über Lemons-Märkte, um wirtschaftspolitische Folgerungen über die EU-Verbraucherschutzregulierung von 1999 abzuleiten. Die beiden Marktdesigns, die im Experiment getestet wurden, unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich des Grades, zu dem die Verbraucher das Qualitätsrisiko tragen müssen. In beiden Märkten haben die Verbraucher mehr Handel getrieben als die (perfekt rationale) Marktversagenstheorie vorhersagt. Im risikoreichen, aber nicht im risikoarmen Markt erlitten Sie dabei erwartete Verluste. Diese Beobachtung kann einen Grund für ein paternalistsiches Handelsverbot liefern. -- The paper uses the results of a lemons market experiment to derive economic policy implications regarding the EU regulation on consumer protection. The two lemons market designs tested in the experiment differed with respect to the risk of purchasing bad quality which the uninformed consumers had to bear. In the high-risk market, but not in the low-risk market, consumers have suffered expected losses. This empirical result may justify a paternalistic regulation that makes warranties mandatory.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2006-08.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200608

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Related research

Keywords: guessing games; beauty contests; market failure; adverse selection; lemon problem; regulatory failure; paternalistic regulation;

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  1. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  2. Kirstein, Annette & Kirstein, Roland, 2004. "Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemons" Markets," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-02 [rev.], Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  3. Heal, Geoffrey, 1977. "Guarantees and Risk-Sharing," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 549-60, October.
  4. Spence, A Michael, 1977. "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 561-72, October.
  5. Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford & Bruno Broseta, . "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games:An Experimental Study," Discussion Papers 00/45, Department of Economics, University of York.
  6. Juergen Noll, 2003. "Does One Size Fit All? A Note on the Harmonization of National Warranty Law as a Tool of Consumer Protection," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 219-231, September.
  7. Roland Kirstein & Hans-Bernd Schäfer, . "Erzeugt der Europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2007-1-1172, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  8. Thomas Eger, . "Einige ökonomische Aspekte der Europäischen Verbrauchsgüterkauf - Richtlinie und ihrer Umsetzung in deutsches Recht," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1032, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  9. Nancy A. Lutz & V. Padmanabhan, 1995. "Why Do We Observe Minimal Warranties?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 417-441.
  10. Heal, Geoffrey, 1976. "Do Bad Products Drive Out Good?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 499-502, August.
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