This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Managers and Students Playing Cournot: Experimental Evidence from Malaysia

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Waichmann, Israel
Requate, Tilman
Siang, Ch'ng Kean

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We report results from a Cournot triopoly experiment with different subject pools: German students, Malaysian students, and Malaysian managers. While German students play Nash, we reject the hypothesis that both Malaysian students and managers select the Nash quantity. Moreover, Malaysian managers perform significantly less competitively than Malaysian students. Finally, the affect of gender is opposite for German and Malaysian subjects. --

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/27674/1/EWP-2008-19.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2008,19.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauewp:7467

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.wiso.uni-kiel.de/econ/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (ZBW - German National Library for Economics).

Related research
Keywords: artefactual field experiment; subject pools; Cournot oligopoly; managers; non-cooperative behavior;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004. "The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs," Artefactual Field Experiments 0039, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. David J. Cooper, 2006. "Are Experienced Managers Experts at Overcoming Coordination Failure?," Artefactual Field Experiments 0033, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
  3. Uri Gneezy & Kenneth L. Leonard & John A. List, 2009. "Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence From a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(5), pages 1637-1664, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," Post-Print halshs-00175004_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 2004. "Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 435-446, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. David J. Cooper, 2006. "Are Experienced Managers Experts at Overcoming Coordination Failure?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(2). [Downloadable!]
  7. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors registered on the RePEc Author Service receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-8.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.