The Provision of Local Public Services in a Risky Environment: An Application to Crime
AbstractWe state efficiency conditions for the provision of congestable local public goods that diminish individual-specific proprietary risks. The optimum level of such a public service is determined by equating the sum of the reductions of the expected property losses due to a better service level with the marginal costs of the service. The optimum size of the providing local authority in terms of population is obtained where the increase in proprietary risks due to congestion meets the decrease in contributions for the original citizens. As an empirical example, we employ Germany?s crime statistic in order to assess the efficiency of the provision of police services at the state level. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2006,03.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Local Public Goods; Congestion; Risk; Crime; Police;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- R50 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - General
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-08-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2006-08-05 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-PBE-2006-08-05 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2006-08-05 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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