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Reading between the lines: Using text analysis to estimate the loss function of the ECB

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  • Paloviita, Maritta
  • Haavio, Markus
  • Jalasjoki, Pirkka
  • Kilponen, Juha
  • Vänni, Ilona

Abstract

We measure the tone (sentiment) of the ECB's Governing Council regarding economic outlook at the time of each monetary policy meeting and use this information together with the Eurosystem/ECB staff macroeconomic projections to directly estimate the Governing Council's loss function. Our results support earlier, more indirect findings, based on reaction function estimations, that the ECB has been either more averse to inflation above 2% ceiling or that the de facto inflation aim has been considerably below 2%. Our results suggest further that an inflation aim of 2% combined with asymmetry is a plausible specification of the ECB's preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Paloviita, Maritta & Haavio, Markus & Jalasjoki, Pirkka & Kilponen, Juha & Vänni, Ilona, 2020. "Reading between the lines: Using text analysis to estimate the loss function of the ECB," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 12/2020, Bank of Finland.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bofrdp:rdp2020_012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sinem Kandemir & Peter Tillmann, 2023. "Not all ECB meetings are created equal," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202312, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    2. Bohl, Martin T. & Kanelis, Dimitrios & Siklos, Pierre L., 2023. "Central bank mandates: How differences can influence the content and tone of central bank communication," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    3. Lucian Briciu & Stefan Hohberger & Luca Onorante & Beatrice Pataracchia & Marco Ratto & Lukas Vogel, 2023. "The ECB Strategy Review - Implications for the Space of Monetary Policy," European Economy - Discussion Papers 193, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank communication; ECB; monetary policy; textual analysis; inflation target; real timeprojections; loss function;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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