Credibility and Strategic Learning in Networks
AbstractThis paper studies a model of diffusion in a fixed, finite connected network. There is an interested party that knows the quality of the product or idea being propagated and chooses an implant in the network to influence other agents to buy or adopt. Agents are either “innovators”, who adopt immediately, or rational. Rational consumers buy if buying rather than waiting maximizes expected utility. We consider the conditions on the network under which efficient diffusion of the good product with probability one is a perfect Bayes equilibrium. Centrality measures and the structure of the entire network are both important. We also discuss various inefficient equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 972.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2011-11-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2011-11-14 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2011-11-14 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"A Theory of Strategic Diffusion,"
2007.70, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Munshi, Kaivan, 2004. "Social learning in a heterogeneous population: technology diffusion in the Indian Green Revolution," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 185-213, February.
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CEPR Discussion Papers
8607, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kimberley Ann Scharf, 2013. "Private Provision of Public Goods and Information Diffusion in Social Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series 4492, CESifo Group Munich.
- Scharf, Kim, 2011. "Private Provision of Public Goods and Information Diffusion in Social Groups," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 47, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
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