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Optimal Audit Policy and Heterogenous Agents

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Author Info
Marisa Ratto (CMPO - University of Bristol)
Thibaud Vergé (University of Southampton)

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Abstract

Frauds can be explained not only in terms of individual willingness to cheat, but may also be driven by opportunities to behave dishonestly. The audit policy should therefore be different for different categories of agents. This paper focuses on the optimal audit policy when there are two categories of agents and shows that the auditor adopts different policies depending on its budget. When resources are quite limited, the auditor sets identical audit probabilities for both types. On the other hand, in most of the cases, the authority should first ensure that people with lower opportunities choose not to commit an offence.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0301/0301001.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0301001.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 22 Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0301001

Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on PC-ScientificWord; pages: 35 ; figures: included/
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Fraud; audit; opportunities; budget allocation.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Picard, Pierre, 1994. "Auditing claims in insurance market with fraud : the credibility issue," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9420, CEPREMAP.
  2. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
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  3. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Greenberg, Joseph, 1984. "Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-13, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-60, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hindriks, J., 1999. "Income Tax Compliance: the No-Commitment Game," Discussion Papers 99/19, University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics.
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  8. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1987. "Audit Classes and Tax Enforcement Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 229-33, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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