Resumo: Se o tempo for uma variável contínua, a comparação dos resultados decorrentes da aplicação dos modelos básicos de duopólio permite concluir que um comportamento à Cournot é mais vantajoso para as empresas do que, alternativamente, uma delas optar por assumir a liderança do mercado à Stackelberg. Tal só não acontece no primeiro momento, contudo, se as empresas optarem por uma estratégia conservadora, estas devem comportar-se à Cournot. Se uma das empresas pretender assumir a liderança, a rival reage de tal forma, que o preço pode aproximar-se do custo marginal em curto espaço de tempo. Nos momentos posteriores ao actual, independentemente do risco, a aplicação do modelo de Cournot, conduz a um equilíbrio estável dado que os lucros de Cournot são em todos esses momentos superiores aos de Stackelberg, independentemente da estratégia escolhida pelas empresas. Palavras-chave: Duopólio, Duráveis, Preço, Lucro Abstract: This paper aims at the comparison between Cournot and Stackelberg pricings for a durable good, assuming time as a continuous variable. It concludes that the Cournot's strategic conduct is better for the duopoly producers than the Stackelberg's leader. This conclusion, however, does not prevail for the first stage, although it does for the remaining. Whether one of the producers acts as a leader, the satellite rival will respond in such a way that the price approaches, in a very short time, the marginal cost. For the remaining stages, but the first one, irrespective of the risk level and the strategic conduct taken, Cournot's model implies a stable equilibrium, based on higher Cournot's profits than Stackelberg's profits. Keywords: Duopoly, Durable, Price, Profit.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number
0202004.
Length: 21 pages Date of creation: 13 Feb 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0202004
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Carl Davidson & Raymond Deneckere, 1984.
"Excess Capacity and Collusion,"
Discussion Papers
675, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Other versions:
Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1990.
"Excess Capacity and Collusion,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 521-41, August.
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