This paper proposes an evolutionary betting mechanism that refers to scientists' academic reputation. The mechanism provides incentives for theoretical and empirical researchers to work on joint projects, thereby producing more general findings and stylized facts that can be used in giving economic policy advice.
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Length: 5 pages Date of creation: 05 Jul 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmh:0004004
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 5 ; figures: none. forthcoming in KYKLOS: Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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Find related papers by JEL classification: A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
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