This paper re-examines the so-called coexistence puzzle in terms of a modified version of the legal restrictions hypothesis initially put forth by Bryant and Wallace (1980). The modification is in terms of dropping a questionable assumption in the original hypothesis; i.e., that large denomination government bonds cannot be intermediated by private banks. This restriction is replaced by one that is arguably more palatable; i.e., that the intermediated monetary instruments created by private banks are not universally acceptable as payment for all exchanges (unlike government money). The friction that gives rise to this latter restriction is one that is commonly employed in monetary models where fiat money is essential for exchange.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Macroeconomics with number
0502020.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: