In this paper I examine whether a society can improve welfare by imposing a legal restriction to forbid the use of nominal bonds as a means of payments for goods. To do so, I integrate a microfounded model of money with the framework of limited participation. While the asset market is Walrasian, the goods market is decentralized and the legal restriction is imposed only in a fraction of the trades. I show that the legal restriction can improve the society's welfare. In contrast to the literature, this essential role of the legal restriction persists even in the steady state and it does not rely on households' ability to trade unmatured bonds for money after observing the taste (or endowment) shocks.
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Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
tecipa-212.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Shouyong Shi, 2005.
"Nominal Bonds And Interest Rates,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 579-612, 05.
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