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Commons, anti-commons, corruption and 'maffia' behavior

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Author Info
Alfredo Canavese (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella & CONICET)

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Abstract

The particular point that will be stressed in this paper is that benefits derived from corrupt behaviour depend on institutions devised to discourage it. The analytical framework used to explore the symmetric tragedies of the commons and the anticommons outlined by James Buchaman and Yong J. Yoon (2000) is useful to deal with the study of the relationship between institutions and corruption. A simple game theoretic model is built to show that corruption produces a tragedy of the anticommons and it can be discouraged by the introduction of competition among corrupt agents to turn it into a tragedy of the commons. It is also shown that coordinated corruption or 'maffia' behaviour produces a better use of resources than uncoordinated corruption.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/le/papers/0411/0411002.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0411002.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 09 Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0411002

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 11
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: corruption; crime; maffia behavior; commons; anticommons;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Federico Weinschelbaum, 2000. "Corruption with Competition Among Hidden Principals," Working Papers 24, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jan 2000. [Downloadable!]
  2. Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1998. "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 387-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Becker, Gary S, 1993. "Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 385-409, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Buchanan, James M & Yoon, Yong J, 2000. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-13, April.
  5. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1997. "The New Economics of Corruption: a Survey and Some New Results," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 45(3), pages 496-515. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Vito Tanzi, 1994. "Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets," IMF Working Papers 94/99, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Hamid Reza Davoodi & Vito Tanzi, 1997. "Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth," IMF Working Papers 97/139, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Corruption," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 599-617, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993. "Corruption," NBER Working Papers 4372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-29.

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