Commons, anti-commons, corruption and 'maffia' behavior
AbstractThe particular point that will be stressed in this paper is that benefits derived from corrupt behaviour depend on institutions devised to discourage it. The analytical framework used to explore the symmetric tragedies of the commons and the anticommons outlined by James Buchaman and Yong J. Yoon (2000) is useful to deal with the study of the relationship between institutions and corruption. A simple game theoretic model is built to show that corruption produces a tragedy of the anticommons and it can be discouraged by the introduction of competition among corrupt agents to turn it into a tragedy of the commons. It is also shown that coordinated corruption or 'maffia' behaviour produces a better use of resources than uncoordinated corruption.
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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 09 Nov 2004
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corruption; crime; maffia behavior; commons; anticommons;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2004-11-22 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2004-11-22 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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